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Abstract
We study the political-economic determinants and consequences of the use of unconventional,
or dirty, weapons, such as landmines, chemical and biological weapons, and nuclear arms. Our
formal model highlights two distinct consequences of using weapons: instantaneous physical
destruction and persistent but fading negative externalities on human activities, such as labor,
in the targeted societies. Adversaries seeking post-war rents choose an optimal combination
of these effects to solve the dilemma such that destructive arms are effective at winning a war
today but diminish future benefits of rents, whereas dirty weapons preserve rents but discour-
age future labor. We demonstrate that dirty weapons are chosen over conventional weapons
when the targeted territory relies economically on capital-intensive, rather than labor-intensive,
industries; produces perishable resources such as oil; and is poor. This study contributes to the
literature on conflict and human security by addressing persistent social and economic suffering
as a consequence of war.
Keywords: War; civilian targeting; rent seeking; non-proliferation; weapons of mass destruc-
tion; landmines; human security
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Iඇඍඋඈൽඎർඍංඈඇ
The last century witnessed the immense proliferation of unconventional weapons, such as
nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as landmines. Among the dramatic transfor-
mations that have occurred in the nature of warfare in the last century, the emergence of such
weapons is one of the most remarkable. The earliest examples of the mass use of such weapons
appeared during WWI. The Second Battle of Ypres in Belgium during spring 1915 is remem-
bered as the first large-scale use of poison gas, or Yperite, by Germany (Edmonds and Wynne
1992).
A century later, unconventional weapons have become more widespread. Landmines are
especially “popular” weapons, which are still laid in more than 60 countries and regions. Al-
though two decades have passed since the establishment of the Mine Ban Treaty in 1997, states
and non-state armed groups, even today, are reported to have installed new landmines in coun-
tries such as Columbia, Myanmar, Syria, and Ukraine. Casualties caused by mines and other
similar weapons totaled 3,308 in 2013 and 3,678 in 2014, with a significant number of victims
still unreported. That is, landmines and similar devices kill at least 10 people, mostly civilians
and including children, every day (Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor 2015).
Among the unconventional weapons that were developed in the last century, nuclear weapons
are particularly notable for their massive destructive power and persistent negative impacts on
society and the environment. Remarkably, atomic weapons have not been used as a means of
solving international disputes since their use by the United States on Japan (Tannenwald 1999,
2005, 2007).
This paper investigates the mechanism through which these weapons are employed in cer-
tain conflicts and areas but not in others. To that end, we specifically elaborate on what we
call dirty weapons, which leave ecological, physiological, and psychological aftereffects, or
“contamination,” on targeted individuals and territory. Such contamination persistently hinders
socio-economic activities in the affected societies–such scars compound the difficulty and com-
plexity of recovery and peace building.
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Thus, this study is an attempt to address, albeit abstractly, social suffering in the theory of
conflict. Existing studies treat weapons as a mere means of instantaneous and fatal destruction
of the targeted community, which is the source of the “inefficiency of war.” Such a framework
dismisses the consequences of the destruction and contamination of lands and ecosystems as a
“normative” concern, and it also disregards the adversaries’ long-term interaction with the tar-
geted territory and society. In reality, however, adversaries in war often continue to engage in
activities in the contaminated territory and with the victimized communities and people. Once
we address such long-term motivations for conflict, arms selection has political-economic im-
plications.
A Pඈඅංඍංർൺඅ-Eർඈඇඈආංർ Aඉඉඋඈൺർඁ
We particularly explore the political-economic causes and consequences of the use of dirty
weapons in a general context, which is applicable to both intra- and interstate conflict. We
argue that an adequate understanding of the political-economic aspects of arms selection is key
to further promoting the cause of non-proliferation regimes. Tactical considerations may often
drive arms selection (at least at the field level); however, political-economic investigations of
arms selection are valuable because they are one of the few channels through which social
scientists can offer practical policy recommendations to minimize social suffering caused by
various weapons and to discourage belligerents from inflicting excessive damage on territories
affected by combat.
Despite the rich literature on non-proliferation regimes (see, among others, Cottrell 2009;
Nadelmann 1990; Rutherford 2000), the political science literature leaves many questions con-
cerning the use of dirtyweapons unaddressed. A notable exception is Legro (1995), who argues
that the “organizational cultures” of the military explain the Anglo-German use and non-use
of submarine attacks, strategic bombing, and chemical warfare during WWII. Complementing
Legro’s work, our study highlights the incentives and decisions of political leaders under whom
military bureaucracies operate, and it also provides a framework with which to explain why cer-
tain forms of combat are (not) employed in particular geographical locations. Another highly
relevant study is Addison, Le Billon and Murshed (2002), who formally demonstrate that the
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availability of lootable resources reduces adversaries’ war effort and, therefore, the intensity of
violence and destruction. However, studies such as Weinstein (2006) and Lujala (2009) suggest
the contrary. We contribute to this literature by shedding light on the heterogeneous aspects of
the damages caused by war: massive destruction from conventional weapons and long-term
devastation from dirty weapons.
The key to our approach is the adversaries’ greed for the rents that are extracted from seized
territory after war. Adversaries competing for territory resort to violence because the acquisition
of the territory is valuable to them in one form or another. Once the war is over, the party that
seizes the territory exploits its valuable resources. The territory may be endowed with natural
resources such as oil and minerals; it may produce agricultural or industrial commodities; or it
may serve strategic purposes such as providing a buffer zone. What naturally follows is that
the user of weapons has a strong incentive to preserve the value of the territory. Given the
greed for rents, the idea of “war as an instrument of policy” (Von Clausewitz 1976) has a self-
contradictory nature because violence undermines the value of the territory that belligerents
desire (e.g., Fearon 1995). The desire for post-conflict extraction often provides an incentive to
minimize damage to the targeted territory (“inefficiency”) at the minimum rather than to fight
an absolute war.
However, for a potential victor, the desire for rents poses a difficult dilemma between the
pursuit of victory and rents. She must win the war before she can exploit the rents, despite that
the more she destroys, the more likely she is to prevail, which is especially the case when rele-
vant resources (e.g., oil, coca, and heavy industry manufacturers) are linked to the opponent’s
capacity to fight. This critical dilemma is solved by the optimal selection of weapons.
Effectively summarizing this article’smotivation, General RaymondOdierno, then-USArmy
Chief of Staff, responded to Donald Trump’s presidential campaign pledge to “knock the hell
out of Iraq’s oil fields” to weaken ISIS and, consequently, “take back the oil” as follows:
There are limits to military power ... [Military strategy is] about sustainable out-
come. And the problem we’ve had is, we’ve had outcomes, but they’ve been only
short-term outcomes because we haven’t looked at, we haven’t properly looked at,
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the political and economic sides of this. It’s got to be all three that come together.
And if you don’t do that, it’s not going to solve the problem (Diamond 2015).
Dൾඌඍඋඎർඍංඈඇ ൺඇൽ Cඈඇඍൺආංඇൺඍංඈඇ ංඇ Wൺඋൿൺඋൾ
To solve the dilemma between victory and rent-seeking, belligerents exploit two key dimen-
sions of weapons: the instantaneous destruction of the targeted territory and the (long-term)
negative externalities on human activities in the area. For simplicity, we hereafter call arms
that primarily cause the former conventional weapons and those that primarily cause the latter
dirty weapons. Clearly, the use of any weapon entails both destruction and contamination. The
destruction of homes and the loss of family certainly traumatize victimized civilians. However,
we conceptually distinguish these functions and explore the mechanism through which each of
them is employed on the battlefield.
The use of conventional weapons, such as aerial bombing, damages material resources and
the lives of soldiers and civilians. Therefore, they decrease the opponent’s capability to counter-
attack, but they also destroy the resources that are at stake. However, dirty weapons are charac-
terized by their (albeit variable) persistent contamination of territory, which undermines human
activities such as labor rather than causing damage to material resources. For instance, conven-
tional weapons destroy a factory, whereas dirty weapons discourage the local population from
resuming operations over a certain period of time due to health hazards or psychological appre-
hension.
Therefore, such weapons are distinct in themanner in which the party that seizes the territory
(hereafter, the “victor”) may exploit the territory. Thus, the victor must choose arms of different
types and calibers that best serve her interests, taking into account the short- and long-term
consequences of arms selection.
It must be emphasized that such decisions are fraught with entangled strategic interactions,
rather than being the result of one-sided decision-making. A simple intuition that an aggressor
will use dirty weapons to avoid the destruction of resources while pursuing victory does not ac-
count for the whole story because the opponent can fight harder if the destruction is limited and
the resources are preserved. Knowing this, the aggressor may employ the strategy of destruc-
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tion to discourage counter-attack. If a counter-attack is not waged, however, the destruction
is inferior to contamination. Ultimately, combat requires a belligerent to intentionally or un-
intentionally consider an optimal combination of weapons, taking into account the opponent’s
reaction.
In this regard, we share interests with the larger body of literature on the effects of natural
resource rents on civil war (e.g., Collier and Hoeffler 1998, 2004; Le Billon 2001; Lujala, Gled-
itsch and Gilmore 2005; Lujala 2009, 2010; Ross 2004, 2012). Specifically, this study sheds
light on a novel aspect of the “resource curse:” certain types of resources causes a local popu-
lation to be victimized by dirty weapons and certain resources to be deliberately preserved by
both sides, which may cause a prolonged war.
Cංඏංඅංൺඇ Tൺඋ඀ൾඍංඇ඀ ൺඇൽ Rൾඇඍ Sൾൾ඄ංඇ඀
A long line of research highlights the trade-off between the use of violence and its con-
sequences during civil war by demonstrating that collateral damage predicts higher levels of
insurgent violence (Condra and Shapiro 2012) and that indiscriminate killing may undermine
civilian support (see, among others, Downes 2007, 2011; Kocher, Pepinsky and Kalyvas 2011).
However, there is no firm consensus on the effect of indiscriminate violence targeting civil-
ians. Lyall (2009) finds that the employment of such a form of violence by a government may
suppress insurgency, whereas Pape (1996) questions the notion that aerial bombing that targets
civilians in an interstate war has decisive effects in coercing the enemy to make peace.
Thus, the question is, who targets civilians and when? Previous research has demonstrated
the following: rebels relying on third-party funding have weak ties to the civilian population and
thus do not refrain from targeting civilians (Weinstein 2006); the degree and type (discriminate
versus indiscriminate) of civilian targeting depends on variations in control over territory within
the context of a specific conflict (Kalyvas 2006); and the evenness of the fighting factions’
balance of power explains civilian casualties (Balcells 2010). Moreover, rebels commit more
civilian killings than governments during civil war (Eck and Hultman 2007).
A common presumption in the literature on civilian involvement in war is that belligerents,
i.e., governments and insurgents, rely on informational and logistical support that offered by
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the local population; therefore, civilians are strategically targeted depending on which side they
(are perceived to) take (Berman, Shapiro and Felter 2011; Kalyvas 2006; Shapiro and Weid-
mann 2015; Valentino 2013; Valentino, Huth and Balch-Lindsay 2004). Civilians may directly
provide soldiers with resources to fight (Blattman and Miguel 2010), or insurgents may loot the
homes and businesses of civilians to augment their resources (Azam 2002; Azam and Hoeffler
2002). Thus, the literature has assumed that the roles of civilians in war and insurgency have
strategic and logistical effects during combat.
However, little theoretical and empirical attention has been devoted to another, yet crucial,
role that civilians play in the aftermath of war, which thus affects belligerents’ strategies during
war. We depart from the common framework of civilians as players of supportive roles during
war, a means for combat, by treating the local population’s economic roles as an objective.
Moreover, in our framework, ex-combatants decide whether to labor in the ex-combat territory
after the war: soldiers “get back to peacetime work.” Such a significant overlap between sol-
diers and the local population, especially in civil war, reinforces belligerents’ dilemma between
victory and rent-seeking.
Tඁൾ Tඁൾඈඋඒ
In the formal model introduced here, two players, Side A and Side B, are in conflict in a
territory. Consider A (“she”) and B (“he”) as the conflicting factions (groups) in a civil war or
as states in an interstate war (although we use singular nouns for simplicity). Side B initially
possesses the territory that produces rents such as natural resources and industrial commodities
if the local population engages in production. In the context of civil war,B can be considered an
armed group that is headquartered in the territory, which will still need to engage in economic
activities after the war. Alternatively, B may be a collective of the armed group and the local
population. They may not share aligned incentives, but the model’s simple framework reflects
a situation in which the armed group has strong control over the population under its dominion.
Side A pursues a change in the status quo, seeking the rents that are extracted from the terri-
tory that is at stake. Accordingly, A can be interpreted as the offense side and B as the defense
side, although this labeling is ultimately inconsequential. We first introduce the environment
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in which the arms are selected in the course of war and then proceed to describe the post-war
phase in which the victor exploits rents from the seized territory.
Destruction and Contamination in the Course of War
During combat, A makes two important decisions regarding the plan of attack. A first
chooses the level of physical destruction of the territory. Suppose that she selects either low
destruction (d) or high destruction (d), where d < d. There is an additional property of A’s
tactics: the level of contamination of the territory, which takes either a low value (e) or a high
value (e).1 Therefore, A has four potential plans of attack, which are summarized in Table 1.
[Table 1 about here.]
The crucial difference between physical destruction and contamination is that destruction
instantaneously decreases the nominal amount of material resources2 available in the targeted
land, whereas contamination inflicts persistent health threats on the people who engage in ac-
tivities in the area. In the course of war, therefore, A’s arms selection affects B’s capability of
and willingness to counter-attack.
Because B’s armaments and production depend on the logistical services and exploitation
of energy resources in the area, destruction affects the defender’smaterial capability to execute
a counter-attack. For analytical simplicity, we assume that the high level of destruction (d)
completely undermines B’s ability to fight. Therefore, A seizes the territory that potentially
produces 1 - d unit of rents, with the original endowment of rents normalized to one unit.
However, low destruction (d) allows B to decide whether to fight back to retain its territory
after A’s plan of attack is executed. If B decides to surrender, A seizes the entire territory, which
potentially produces 1 - d unit of rents. Then, the war is over.3 If B fights, he retains a portion
 2 (0; 1) of the land that produces 1 - d unit of rents, but the remainder is completely destroyed
1We use the dichotomous choice for simplicity without substantive costs because our pri-
mary interest is in highlighting the comparison between conventional and dirty weapons.
2In this framework, we focus primarily on damage to resources rather than to a targeted
population, i.e., human lives. That is, major destruction does not necessarily mean that all of
the inhabitants die.
3Termination of conflict is a complex phenomenon and is analyzed elsewhere (e.g., Leven-
toğlu and Slantchev 2007). Nevertheless, we retain the stylized description of war termination
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as a cost of the counter-attack. (Thus, each side’s attack separately entails the “inefficiency of
war.”) B’s choice is denoted by an indicator variable f 2 f0; 1g, where f = 1 indicates that B
“fights.”
Contamination affects B’s willingness to fight and work in the territory because he is dis-
couraged from staying in the infected region. The level of contamination (e) determines the
probability that the population will remain healthy enough to engage in economic activities in
the territory in each period, denoted , which can alternatively be interpreted as the proportion
of individuals who are healthy enough to engage in labor, by considering B as a collective.
Although we say that  is the probability that B “dies,” it simply means that he does not make
decisions thereafter,4 and hence the effect may also be psychological. For instance, the threat of
mustard bombs could be mostly psychological in the sense that people do not return and work
in the targeted areas even after the gas has dispersed.
B is affected by contamination if he decides to fight in the contaminated region, but he is
not affected if he does not fight. That is, B can relocate himself to avoid exposure. (Relocation
is discussed below.) For analytical simplicity, we assume that  is zero if A chooses low con-
tamination (e), while it takes some positive value when A chooses dirty weapons (e). B’s utility
when he is “dead” is normalized to zero. Thus, both destruction and contamination have neg-
ative impacts on the defender’s counter-attack and post-war production, but in different ways.
The sequence of moves is summarized in Figure 1.
[Figure 1 about here.]
The Post-War Extraction of Rents in Recovering Territory
Once the war is over, the players begin to produce and consume. Although most theories
in international relations posit that the value of the acquired goods is immediately consumable,
we depart from such a setting by explicitly incorporating the process whereby the population
in this analysis because we are interested in the aggressor’s arms selection rather than the ad-
versaries’ choice to end the war.
4That is, he does not “labor,” which will be detailed in the following section.
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produces valuables. Specifically, the new owner of the land must recruit the local population to
produce rents.
Upon seizing the territory,5 A offers a fixed wage ofw > 0 to recruit B.6 He decides whether
to work for the wage or to relocate to another area that is not contaminated. B’s choice is denoted
l 2 f0; 1g, where l = 1 indicates that B accepts A’s offer and engages in “labor.” This exchange
of wage and labor is iterated in an infinite time horizon with discrete time, t = 1, 2...,1. Period
t = 0 represents the “war phase” that is described above, and t  1 is the “post-war phase.”
When B relocates, a new job opportunity yields a reservation value of , where 0 <  < w.
This means that B prefers working in his home territory to relocation unless health threats are
severe and he also prefers relocation to “unemployment” (not working) in his home territory.7
w should be interpreted as B’s subjective valuation of the homeland relative to elsewhere, in-
cluding psychological utility, rather than literally as a wage.
As in the moment of the counter-attack, B is exposed to health threats if he decides to work
in the contaminated area, provided that A employed dirty weapons in the war phase. Once he is
infected, he continues to face the risk of “death” unless he relocates from the area.8 For example,
consider a situation in which A’s attack incurs pollution such that  = 0:3. The likelihood that
B survives the period of exposure is 0:7. The likelihood that B survives two consecutive periods,
5Recall that A “controls” the territory if A chose high destruction (d) or if A selected low
destruction and B did not fight.
6We suppress the choice between slavery and voluntary labor and just assume that A must
pay costs for production. Moreover, we focus on the aggressor-defender relationship, i.e, we
assume that the source of labor inputs in the territory is B’s population, but the same conclusion
can be drawn regarding any labor force that does not belong to B, such as contractors from A,
who have the same incentive in deciding whether to work in the territory as B does.
7Allowing for the possibility that  > w does not affect any of our qualitative conclusions.
8His health is threatened by the contamination only when he resides in the polluted terri-
tory, not when he relocates himself, possibly because he can stop the negative health effects
from progressing by taking appropriate medication. This assumption provides him an incentive
to relocate from the contaminated territory, even after he fights back at t = 0 under certain
conditions. Otherwise, he would always stay in the contaminated territory when he fights back.
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therefore, is 0:72 = 0:49. Substantively, this implies that his health will not be restored if he is
exposed to contamination and as long as he resides in the infected area.
The pollution of the land imposed by dirtyweapons disappears over time, which allows B to
return to the territory where he once resided even in a situation in which he prefers to relocate
for a certain period of time.9 The effect of radiation emitted by nuclear weapons diminishes
over time, and landmines can be gradually removed by demining.10 We therefore parametrize
the persistence of biological or psychological threats by  2 (0; 1). The level of contamination
in the targeted land in period t + 1 is  time as much as that in the former period t. Thus, the
instantaneous probability that B survives when he returns in period t is 1   t. For example,
suppose that  = 0:3 and  = 0:9. Then, the health threat to a person who returns in the initial
period is  = 0:3, that to one who comes back in the next period is 0:9  0:3 = 0:27, and the
figure is 0:92  0:3 = 0:243 at t = 2. Taken together, the probability that one who relocates
for a while and come back at t = 2 survives in the next period is (1   0:243)2  0:573. This
motivates B to relocate until the health threats of the land are sufficiently reduced.
As contamination fades over time, the targeted territory recovers from physical destruction
provided that production occurs in the territory. Cities are reconstructed and seeds are sown.
The crucial difference between contamination and destruction, however, is that the former does
not require labor inputs to recover, whereas the latter does. Therefore, recovery occurs only
if the defender chooses to work in the territory.  2 (0; 1) represents the degree to which the
territory recovers from physical destruction in each period when B engages in production in
the territory. Specifically, when B engages in production in the territory for  periods, the total
pie of resources recovers to 1 - d. For instance, if A’s attack destroys 30% of the territory’s
9Of course, B is allowed to opt for the outside option again after returning to the territory,
but this does not take place in equilibrium.
10As noted above, this is not to say that B’s health recovers over time; rather, the impact of the
instantaneous health threat of the land declines over time. Thus, the instantaneous probability
of B’s survival is determined by the level of contamination when he returns to work. He is
exposed to the pollution when he returns and will continue to suffer from the persistent health
effects of the initial exposure, although the pollution of the land fades away as time passes.
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resources, i.e., d = 0:3, the productive power of the land at the moment of war termination is
0.7. Supposing that the territory’s productive power recovers as quickly as  = 0:1 and people
begin working immediately after the war, their labor reduces the damage of the land from 0.3 to
0.03 in the next period and to 0.003 in the following period. Therefore, the overall production
of the territory will increase from 0.7 to 0.97 in the next period and then to 0.997. That is, the
remaining damage becomes miniscule as B engages in production for a long period of time:
lim!1 d = 0. Assume that w < (1   d), meaning that it is not the case that B never has
an incentive to counter-attack.
Here, we shed light on the characteristics of the targeted territory that affect the degree to
which labor input leads to reconstruction, i.e., the value of . As the example above describes,
a larger  denotes a greater reduction in damage at a given time, i.e., a quicker recovery. The
degree of recovery in each period may depend on the economic structure of the territory and
the recoverability of the resources at stake.
One important attribute is the economic structure of the targeted territory. Applying the
classical distinction of the factors of production, destruction reduces capital input, whereas
contamination decreases labor input. Once destroyed, a territory with a pre-war economy that
relied on capital-intensive industries, compared with labor-intensive industries, recovers more
slowly because infrastructure, factories, andmachinerymust be reconstructed before production
can resume. The petroleum, refining, and electricity generation industries are examples of such
sectors. In contrast, territory where labor-intensive industries are dominant, ceteris paribus,
recovers quickly to the pre-war production level once the labor force returns to work.
Another element that influences reconstruction pertains to the nature of the resources em-
bedded in the land: recoverable and perishable resources.11 Some resources such as oil and
minerals are irrecoverable once they are destroyed, whereas resources such as agricultural com-
modities and infrastructure are recoverable if a sufficient amount of human effort is invested. A
good example of an irrecoverable resource is the massive destruction of oil during the Gulf War
when the Iraqi forces set fire to oil wells in Kuwait during their withdrawal. The fire continued
11Addison, Le Billon and Murshed (2002) also detail the effects of the recoverability (re-
newability) of resources on the severity of war.
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to burn for nearly a year and destroyed approximately one billion barrels of oil reserves. Al-
though other resources, such as minerals, are not as easy to destroy as oil, they are irrecoverable
because they cannot be recovered by human efforts once they are destroyed.12
Aඇൺඅඒඌංඌ ඈൿ Oඉඍංආൺඅ Aඋආඌ Sൾඅൾർඍංඈඇ
In the following analysis, we demonstrate the aggressor’s optimal plan of attack under the
environment described in the previous section, solving for the unique pure strategy subgame-
perfect Nash equilibrium. The equilibrium is formally derived and defined in the appendix, and
in what follows, we informally analyze the players’ equilibrium behavior and demonstrate the
main intuitions of the model.
Destruction Precludes Contamination
The first intuition that we introduce is that the aggressor strategically selects between phys-
ical destruction and contamination, depending on the nature of the rents.
Lemma 1 Side A never combines high destruction and high contamination.
As noted in the previous section, major destruction deprives B of the material resources to
launch a counter-attack, which leads to his surrender. Because physical destruction is enough
for A to win the war, her decision on pollution depends solely on her desire for post-war rents.
Remembering that the production of rents relies on B’s labor, A can acquire larger rents by
having B stay in the territory and work for wages. Therefore, A never contaminates the area
because health threats will prompt B to relocate from the infected area for a certain period of
time. Although Bwill return when the pollution fades sufficiently that his income in the infected
territory becomes equally or more attractive than his income in another location, A’s gain until
B returns always falls short of that with B’s full labor.
This implies that adversaries in general refrain from the tactical use of nuclear weapons,
which is characterized by both high destructive power and hazardous post-explosive contami-
nation. This implication is consistent with empirical regularity. Although we agree that deter-
rence is the primary logic behind the non-use of nuclear weapons, scholars argue that a “nuclear
12Note that destruction of irrecoverable resources is an off-path choice and is unlikely to
occur in reality. The degree to which a resource is recoverable should be considered continuous.
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taboo” also discourages nuclear powers from employing such arms, emphasizing that they have
not used even been used in confrontations between nuclear powers, such as the Kargil War,
or even against non-nuclear states, for example, in the Korean War (Tannenwald 1999, 2005,
2007). Our explanation here helps us to better comprehend the emergence of such a norm by
illuminating the mechanism by which a critical mass of states commits to the non-use of such
weapons before the idea reaches the “tipping point” of a norm cascade, where an increasing
number of followers imitate the behavior of the critical mass (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998).
Contamination and Surrender
Next, we analyze B’s optimal decision on whether to surrender or counter-attack when A
initially chooses low destruction. In contrast with the previous scenario, in this situation, B
is capable of conducting a counter-attack. Because he must compare the benefit of retaining
his land and the risk of “death,” his decision is conditional on A’s choice of contamination. In
the following section, we first examine B’s decision under high contamination and then that
decision under low contamination.
Lemma 2 If Side A chooses low destruction and high contamination, Side B fights back if
the territory’s economy relies on labor-intensive industries or recoverable resources, whereas
he surrenders if the territory’s economy relies on capital-intensive industries or perishable re-
sources.
First, consider a situation in whichA imposes high contamination, following low destruction.
If B surrenders and A gains control over the entire territory, B, in each period after the conclusion
of the war, compares his utility from staying away from the polluted territory and returning to
work for a wage under health threats. As the health threats fade over time and, hence, his utility
of working under A gradually increases, there is a point in time ~t, at which these options become
equally attractive. Once B returns at t = ~t, staying and working for a wage in the territory
continues to be his best choice. Note that recovery from physical destruction does not affect
B’s decision when he surrenders because he works in exchange for a constant wage, whereas A
exploits all of the benefits from reconstruction.
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If B fights and retains a portion  of the territory, he returns to the territory for production
earlier than when he would after surrendering. A crucial difference between the cases of surren-
der and counter-attack is that in the latter case, B himself can consume the entire rents produced
by his labor. That is, he can enjoy the benefit of recovery if he works in the reconstruction.
Recalling that B’s labor is necessary for the territory to recover from physical destruction, B has
a strong incentive to return at some time t^ that is smaller than ~t. It is intuitive that B is more
motivated to work for his own land than for another’s. Thus, if he fights, he is exposed to more
severe health threats.
The timing of B’s return is also affected by the characteristic of the territory, i.e., the degree
of recovery from physical destruction given the labor input. For example, if the territory’s
economy relies on heavy industries, B’s labor does not quickly recover the potential of the land
because such industries require capital and infrastructure before restarting production. Similarly,
natural resources such as oil cannot be reconstructed once destroyed. In contrast, if the economy
relies on light industries, such as textiles and food, recovery is relatively easy as long as workers
return. Intuitively, B returns earlier if the territory’s economic structure is such that human labor
matters more for reconstruction because his labor under health threats will be greatly rewarded.
Then, B’s decision between surrender and counter-attack largely depends on the magnitude
of health threats  and the economic structure of the territory represented by . If the health
threats are extremely high, such that  approaches 1, B always surrenders and relocates to avoid
exposure to contamination. In contrast, if the health threats are extremely low, such that 
approaches 0, B always fights back and retains the fruits of the territory.
When the health threats  take any intermediate value, therefore, B’s choice depends on the
external environment, especially . Fighting becomes more desirable as  decreases, that is, as
resources recover more quickly. One interpretation of this is that B is more likely to resist in the
case in which adversaries fight over territory with labor-intensive industries that can be quickly
restored by B’s labor. Another way of interpreting the lemma is that B is more likely to surrender
when rents from the territory come from perishable resources, such as oil. The intuition is that
B has a greater incentive to fight to recapture the territory and control production if he directly
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internalizes the benefit of recovery. Thus, the primary effect of contamination is to discourage
B from engaging in activities in the targeted area, rather than depriving him of his life.
Lemma 3 If Side A chooses low destruction and low contamination, the defender always fights
back, regardless of the nature of the rents (territory).
In contrast with the scenario of high contamination, B always chooses to engage in counter-
attacks if A chooses low contamination with low destruction. B is essentially eager to fight back
and retain his land, knowing that his labor will be exploited by A once she occupies the territory.
In the case of low destruction and low contamination, therefore, B retains both the capability
and willingness to fight.
To Destroy or To Contaminate?
We now complete the analysis by highlighting A’s choice of arms selection in anticipation
of B’s reactions, as characterized above.
Lemma 4 Side A’s optimal choice is either high destruction with low contamination or low
destruction with high contamination.
Because greedy belligerents seek to exploit the occupied territory after victory, they are
motivated to preserve either natural resources or human labor for future extraction and, hence,
pursue victory by attacking either the capability or morale of the adversary. They do not attack
both because destroyed and uninhabited land will offer little value.
Specifically, in the previous section, we demonstrated that A never imposes both high de-
struction and high contamination because massive destruction is sufficient for victory and con-
tamination only incurs unnecessary health threats that discourage the local population from
working for A, the new ruler.
Moreover, low destruction combined with high contamination always yields an equally de-
sirable or better outcome than low destruction with low contamination.13 Additionally, the
13Note that A is not affected by contamination because she can let B work in the polluted
area.
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previous section shows that low destruction with low contamination always induces B’s counter-
attack, in which case A gains nothing. Because the worst-case scenario with low destruction and
high contamination is that B fights back, low destruction with high contamination is a (weakly)
better option than low destruction with low contamination. Thus, A’s optimal strategy is to rely
on either conventional or dirty weapons but not both.
Lemma 5 Side A selects destructive weapons with low contamination when the resources at
stake are labor-intensive or recoverable and selects low destruction with high contamination
when the resources at stake are capital-intensive or irrecoverable.
Finally, A chooses whether to employ the destructive strategy (high destruction and low con-
tamination) or the dirty strategy (low destruction and high contamination), while anticipating
B’s reaction during and after the war. Recall that the destructive strategy completely nullifies
B’s armament and, hence, A can exploit rents once B returns to the territory. The dirty strategy
may or may not force B to surrender, depending on the characteristics of the resources avail-
able in the territory. B surrenders if capital-intensive industries or irrecoverable resources are at
stake, whereas he fights back if labor-intensive industries or recoverable resources are at stake
because he wishes to obtain the benefits of reconstruction rather than to work for a fixed wage
in the latter case.
Thus, it is straightforward to understand that A employs the destructive strategy if B is antic-
ipated to resist the dirty strategy, i.e., when the resources at stake are labor-intensive or recov-
erable. As B’s surrender is anticipated following the dirty strategy, i.e., when the resources at
stake are capital-intensive or irrecoverable, A employs the dirty strategy if she is patient enough
to highly appreciate B’s future production after his temporal relocation. Moreover, A relies on
a dirty strategy when destruction imposes sufficiently serious damage on the targeted territory,
knowing that capital-intensive industries are difficult to reconstruct, and resources such as oil
and minerals do not recover once they are destroyed.
It must be stressed that the aggressor’s selection of dirty weapons on capital-intensive and
irrecoverable resources cannot simply be explained by the intuitive logic that valuable resources
should not be destroyed because destroying such resources dramatically increases the odds of
winning. Thus, the aggressor, as our model explicitly highlights, faces a trade-off between
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the probability of victory and the extraction of rents, which, importantly, depends on the de-
fender’s (local population’s) incentives to fight now and to work later. She can afford to use
dirty weapons because she knows that the opponent will be unwilling to launch a counter-attack
when irrecoverable resources are at stake, knowing that his resistance will significantly under-
mine the value of the territory that he is fighting for today. This is why it seems as if they agree
not to fight destructively in certain areas.
Equilibrium and Empirical Implications
We are now able to define the equilibrium behavior.
Proposition 1 The subgame-perfect equilibrium behavior of the game is as follows: when the
resources are labor-intensive/recoverable, A chooses fd; eg and B begins production in the first
period; when the resources are capital-intensive/irrecoverable, A chooses fd; eg and B chooses
f=0 and begins production at t^. All off-path behavior is as previously described.
This can be rephrased in conventional terms as follows (summarized in Table 2):
Proposition 2 When the resources at stake are labor-intensive or recoverable, destructive, con-
ventional weapons are more likely to be employed; when the resources at stake are capital-
intensive or irrecoverable, dirty weapons without much destructive capacity are more likely to
be employed.
[Table 2 about here.]
It is worth stressing that the above proposition allows a contextual interpretation of the
effects of the nature of rents on arms selection: belligerents optimize their selection of arms
given an available set of resources, that is, the associations between specific rents and warfare
depend on the combination of available rents. Thus, it is possible that in one country a certain
natural resource may be contaminated by dirty weapons and survive destruction, whereas it is
destroyed in another country. For example, a belligerent lacking capital may seek to protect
electricity generation facilities with landmines, whereas one possessing abundant capital may
not hesitate to destroy such facilities.
The model also yields the following implication regarding the area to be targeted by dirty
weapons.
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Proposition 3 Holding the resource endowment and all else constant, wealthier societies are
less likely to be affected by dirty weapons and are more likely to experience destruction than
poorer societies, and vice versa.
Recall that after A wins the territory, B returns to the field for production if he prefers work-
ing in the territory to relocation and earning a reservation value (). Therefore, a higher reserva-
tion value (), which captures the abundance of economic opportunities, implies that relocation
is more favorable to B and, hence, labor input recovers very slowly. If A anticipates that the
locals, i.e., the workforce, will not return due to abundant economic opportunities outside of the
territory, she has little incentive to preserve a clean working environment for the future workers.
Thus, she is better off maximizing the present chance of victory with destructive weapons if the
society in which they are fighting is wealthy and provides decent employment opportunities.
This proposition makes a prediction regarding which countries are more susceptible to massive
aerial bombing: for instance, Germany and Japan during WWII.
Conversely, in underdeveloped societies, people often have no choice but to stay and work
in a contaminated area. If that is the case, the aggressor does not hesitate to use dirty weapons
and preserve material resources because the aggressor does not need to preserve clean working
conditions for future workers to incentivize them to return. This explains the tragic tendency
that people in underdeveloped societies are more likely to be victimized by dirty weapons and
that they are likely to stay in (or return to) their contaminated homeland and suffer, as wewitness
in parts of Vietnam affected by “Agent Orange.”
Aඇ Iඅඅඎඌඍඋൺඍංඈඇ: Lൺඇൽආංඇൾඌ ൺඇൽ Bඈආൻංඇ඀ ංඇ Cൺආൻඈൽංൺ
As is commonly understood, landmines are designed to defend military positions and to
channel enemy forces’ movement, and they are also used to secure economic assets. Neverthe-
less, the determinants of the use of landmines remain under-studied, despite the rich literature
on the economic and social consequences of landmines (see, e.g., Andersson, Palha da Sousa
and Paredes 1995; Gibson et al. 2007; Merrouche 2008; Roberts 2011).
What specific assets, then, do belligerents “protect” with landmines? One straightforward
answer is that landmines are planted to protect valuable assets and resources from opposition
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forces. For instance, oil refineries are one of the most heavily mined assets. During the Libyan
Civil War, Gaddafi’s troops allegedly used thousands of landmines in the oil refinery town of
Brega to keep the rebel forces away from the assets (Birsel 2011). However, this remains an
insufficient account, as landmines are often entrenched in countries and areas that are poor in
natural resources. Cambodia during its civil war provides illustrative example as an agrarian
society that was one of the most heavily mined countries in the world.
Cambodia’s dominant source of revenue before the civil war was agricultural commodities,
especially rice. The value added by agriculture to its GNP was approximately 50% in the late
1960s; cultivated land represented just 16.7% of the country, while 73% of the land was covered
by state-owned forest. The percentage of the population engaged in agriculture reached as high
as 76% in the mid-1960s. In this predominantly agrarian country, 84% of the cultivated land
was used for rice cropping. Rice was also the major export: 96% of the export value in 1968
came from agricultural commodities, and half a million tons of rice (30% of its production) was
exported to foreign countries every year (Takahashi 1965; Yamashita 1980). The dependence
on rice grew during the civil war because the Khmer Rouge pursued a purely agrarian society,
holding out the ideal of a “food supply which would feed the country and provide a large surplus,
particularly of rice, for export ... [w]ith all but a handful of the population put into agricultural
labor” (Vickery 1984, Ch.3).
Given the resource-scarce nature of Cambodia, it is not straightforward to predict which
areas would be more likely to be victimized by landmines as opposed to conventional attacks
such as aerial bombing. If landmines are used only to protect valuable assets, were rice paddies
guarded by mines? The answer is simply “no.”
Data collected by the Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority (CMAA)
and the Cambodian Genocide Program14 show that aerial bombing was concentrated in the
eastern regions of the country, especially the Kampong Cham, Kandal, Prey Veng, Svay Rieng
and Kandal provinces. In contrast, the western part, consisting of the provinces of Pailin and
14The Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority (http://www.cmaa.gov.
kh/). The Cambodian Genocide Program at Yale University (http://gsp.yale.edu/
case-studies/cambodian-genocide-program) (both accessed July 15, 2016).
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western Battambang, was one of the world’s most heavily mined areas, and the local population
still suffers from remaining mines today.
A commonly accepted account of these patterns is that the landmines were entrenched to pro-
tect the headquarters of the Khmer Rouge in the Pailin-Battambang region, while the bombing
targeted base areas of Vietnamese communists along the border between Cambodia and South
Vietnam. It is documented elsewhere that the Khmer Rouge, during the later days of its guerrilla
warfare, was headquartered in Pailin. Moreover, massive bombing in the eastern region was
conducted primarily by the United States to pave the way toward the “Vietnamization” of the
Vietnam War. During an operation called “Menu,” which began in March 1969, B-52 bombers
conducted aerial campaigns against several base areas along the border. This was followed by
massive air strikes, which were called “Operation Freedom Deal,” and “incursions” by ground
troops intended to clear the communists’ sanctuaries.
Our theory highlights a mechanism by which rents affected arms selection and complements
those tactical factors. According to our theory, dirty weapons are more likely to be employed
when the resources at stake are perishable or capital-intensive because an aggressor contami-
nates to expel adversaries while preserving the resources, anticipating the future return of the
labor force. Conversely, conventional weapons are more likely to be used when the resources
at stake are labor-intensive; the aggressor can deter counter-attack by destroying the resources
that sustain the rebels’ capability to fight and can still recover economic activities by simply
bringing labor back.15
Again, agriculture was the dominant source of income for Cambodia. Because most of the
country was covered by forest, only limited plots were suitable for farming. Cultivated plots
were concentrated in theMekong basin in the eastern region, and they were also sparsely located
around Lake Tonle Sap (Central Intelligence Agency 1972; Crocker 1962). Nevertheless, there
15Landmines are typically considered “defensive” weapons, whereas our theory distinguishes
between the “aggressor” and the “defender.” Our theoretical framework, however, is applicable
to landmines because the “aggressor” in the context of the use of landmines simply refers to a
party using the weapons and the “defender” refers to local or any other contracted labor on
whom the former relies in producing and exploiting rents.
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was another notable source of income: gemstones in Pailin. It was widely known that the
town of Pailin had an abundant reserve of rubies and sapphires, which the Khmer Rouge, of
course, attempted to monopolize (Prasso 1994). The smuggling of gems, especially to Thailand,
financed the Khmer Rouge’s guerrilla warfare (Diffidenti 1994; French 2002).
Thus, gemstones were the major irrecoverable source of income, whereas rice represented
the primary recoverable/labor-intensive resource. Although mining is usually considered a
labor-intensive industry, gem-mining in Cambodia was less labor-intensive relative to rice crop-
ping with underdeveloped technologies.
Closer observation reveals that bombing reached far beyond the base areas and the region
within 21 miles of the border that were set as the primary targets of U.S. operations. This is
because the U.S. shifted its goal from Vietnamization to the protection of the anti-communist
regime as the domestic power struggle in Cambodia intensified. For this reason, the bombard-
ment targeted broad areas across theMekong basin, although U.S. policy-makers, such as Henry
Kissinger, and Prince Norodom Sihanouk, Cambodia’s head of state until he was overthrown by
General Lon Nol in March 1970, emphasized that the bombing exclusively targeted rebel bases
(Kissinger 1979, pp.250-254). The victimized areas coincided with the locations of farmland,
or more precisely, specific soils that were suitable for agriculture (e.g., alluvial soil) (Crocker
1962). For instance, the northern part of Prey Veng province was covered by hydromorphics
that were unsuitable for rice cultivation and was scarcely attacked, while the surrounding re-
gions were burnt out. Additionally, a considerable amount of unexploded ordnance has been
found in affected farmland (Owen and Kiernan 2006, p.62). One possible explanation for this
coincidence is that the bombing targeted inhabited areas. Nevertheless, the important factor
here is that the bombing did not exclusively target guerrilla bases in the mountainous areas but
instead populated farming areas with the potential to provide human and material resources to
the rebels.
In contrast, landmines were heavily planted in the areas surrounding the gem mines (Pailin
and western Battamban). Although it is difficult to investigate the decision-making process
within the leadership of the Khmer Rouge because of the lack of reliable information, we can
nevertheless logically infer that the gemmines must have affected the decision to engage in con-
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tamination. The clear contrast between western Battamban, which contained the gem mines,
and eastern Battamban, which was fertile farmland, is noteworthy. The former was contam-
inated by landmines, whereas the latter was affected by bombing, and there was almost no
overlap between the use of the two types of arms. This is not because guerrilla activities were
concentrated only in the mining regions: they were also reported in other provinces, such as
Kampong Cham and Prey Veng, which suffered conventional attacks.
This leads to a rethinking of the causal relationship between resources and contamination.
In the case of Cambodia, for example, historical evidence indicates that the Khmer Rouge con-
taminated its headquarters region to defend the gems. However, our logic suggests that this is
only part of the story. Our logic suggests the possibility that insurgents choose regions where
irrecoverable, rather than recoverable, resources are available because they anticipate that the
government has little incentive to bomb and destroy such rents even if the resources fund rebel
activities: it is the (low) likelihood of destruction, and hence the ease of defense, that determines
where insurgents settle.
In addition to the observed patterns in arms usage, the way in which the local population
reacted to the two types of attacks appears to be consistent with the theory. It suggests that recov-
erable and labor-intensive resources are associated with resistance by the locals and destruction,
while perishable and capital-intensive resources tend to lead to displacement and contamination.
Moreover, in a global-level comparison, its serious lack of economic opportunities exacerbated
Cambodia’s landmine contamination by rationalizing the Khmer Rouge’s expectation that locals
would return in the future to labor in the contaminated areas despite the danger.
Historical accounts document that the unprecedented scale of bombardment motivated the
targeted population to join in rebel activities, rather than to surrender. A local man is said to
recall that “often people were made angry by the bombing and went to join the revolution.”
One of the leaders of the Khmer Rouge, Chhit Do, also said that “[i]t was because of their
dissatisfaction with the bombing that they kept on cooperating with the Khmer Rouge, joining
up with the Khmer Rouge, sending their children off to go with them” (Werner and Huynh 1994,
p. 225).
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In contrast, many of the local population in the Pailin-Battamban region fled into Thailand.
Consequently, the Khmer Rouge had to lease concessions to Thai mining companies, which sent
their own labor to exploit the gemstones, while the physical “risks to the concessionaires ... were
considerable” (French 2002). Later, the locals gradually returned. Until the 1990s, thousands of
miners, fearing the landmines, still paid tolls to the Khmer Rouge for the opportunity to search
for gems, especially rubies (Magistad 1989).
Furthermore, the theory provides an explanation for why there is surprisingly little overlap
between the regions that were affected by the destruction of bombing and those that were con-
taminated by landmines. Combatants even seem to agree on the selection of arms, despite the
intuitive logic that if one party protects resources using landmines, the opposing party should
have a considerable incentive to destroy those resources to weaken the adversary.16 The party
in possession of the resources may also be willing to sabotage such resources before they are
lost to the enemy. Contrary to intuition, adversaries appear to have cooperated to refrain from
destroying perishable resources or industries that are difficult to recover. Indeed, the town in
Pailin did not suffer any major destruction during the civil war or during the capture of the town
by the government and its recapture by the Khmer Rouge in 1994.
This brief description of the Cambodian civil war shows that the country’s economic struc-
ture was in part responsible for the pattern of destruction and contamination, as well as of dis-
placement, during and after the war. On the one hand, resource-intensive commodities such
as gemstones, one of Cambodia’s few commodity exports other than rice during the war, were
targeted by landmines, but they did not suffer the immediate destruction of conventional bat-
tle and bombing because they are perishable. On the other hand, rice fields, the source of the
predominant labor-intensive commodity, were victimized by conventional, destructive arms.
Finally, it must be noted that, in Cambodia, conventional attacks also left devastating after-
effects as landmines dis. Even today, unexploded ordnance (UXO) discovered in villages and
farmlands still threaten people’s lives. In this regard, bombardment was definitely a dirty cam-
paign. However, this does not necessarily blur the theoretical distinction between destruction
16Recall that Legro (1995) also focuses on “cooperation” regarding the forms of combat
during WWII.
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and contamination because adversaries must not have considered the contamination that was
caused by UXO ex ante arms selection. Nevertheless, this does not imply that the unintended
contamination by bombardment is less important than the intended devastation of social activi-
ties. Instead, we aim to highlight one of many significant aspects of warfare and its aftermath
in this particular study.
Cඈඇർඅඎൽංඇ඀ Rൾආൺඋ඄ඌ
This paper is motivated by a question that we believe is theoretically, empirically, and nor-
matively significant: why and under what conditions do belligerents use dirty weapons such as
landmines, chemical and biological weapons, and nuclear arms? In contrast to existing studies
focusing on the tactical and normative aspects of such arms, this paper highlights the political-
economic causes and consequences of using dirty and destructive weapons. Although we ac-
knowledge that tactical considerations are crucial determinants of arms selection, it is worth
elucidating the political-economic aspects of arms selection because they may illuminate the
only, if any, window of opportunity for scholars to influence policy-makers’ decisions regard-
ing the use of dirty weapons.
Our theory departs from the conventional framework for studying war in two respects.
First, we extend the analytic time horizon to the post-war period, whereas existing studies treat
weapons merely as a means of the instantaneous and fatal destruction of targets and disregard
the victor’s long-term interaction with the destroyed territory and society. Second, we highlight
adversaries’ greed for rents extracted from seized territory after war and their dilemma between
the pursuit of victory and rent-seeking. In this framework, adversaries have political-economic
motivation to carefully select arms, taking into account the trade-off between destroying and
contaminating the rents.
The theory yields three sets of results. First, an aggressor does not use weapons that are
characterized by both high destruction and contamination, such as nuclear arms. Moreover, the
choice of weaponry in warfare largely depends on the degree to which the targeted territory
recovers from physical destruction given its labor inputs. In general, the aggressor relies more
on dirtyweapons if the economy of the territory relies on capital-intensive industries such as oil
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refining and heavy industry and if she seeks rents from resources that cannot be restored once
destroyed, such as oil. Finally the theory also demonstrates that contamination is most likely
in poor societies endowed with natural resources, while wealthier societies tend to experience
higher degrees of destruction.
The extant theoretical literature on war has immensely advanced our understanding of the
causes of war. Nevertheless, a more comprehensive understanding of the substantive particular-
ity of war, not as a mere “costly lottery,” will be possible if we shed light on the elements of war
that frighten us more than any other political event. We posit that the fact that war ruthlessly
changes the way in which we live, both physically and economically, is one such element. To
our knowledge, this study is one of the first steps toward incorporating the perspective of human
security into a formal model of conflict, and it addresses the oft-neglected issue of protecting
people from traditional military threats, health threats associated with war, and economic suffer-
ing in the aftermath of war. However, our study illuminates just one important aspect of social
suffering and the aftereffects caused by dirty weapons. Therefore, there are many important
issues to be addressed in future research.
One immediate step to advance the current framework is to extend the logic presented in
this study to nuclear deterrence. For such deterrence be effective, it is necessary that both
parties be able to credibly commit to using a weapon that both destroys physical resources
and contaminates the targeted territory. Given the implications drawn from the model, such a
commitment is expected to be a function of the nature of the belligerents’ motives, including
rents and regime claims, as well as of their political institutions.
Empirical investigations of the implications that can be drawn from this article, of course,
is another further step that is necessary to advance our understanding of the patterns of arms
selection and their aftermaths. Regarding the manner in which the data are collected in mined
fields, we suggest that landmines should be distinguished from unexploded ordnance (UXO).
Currently, many data sets on landmines also include UXO because most international and na-
tional institutions that monitor landmine contamination pool landmine and UXO contamination
in their data. This practice, of course, has a practical reason: once used, the problems pertain-
ing to landmines and UXO are essentially equivalent (see, e.g., Roberts 2011). However, the
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differences between the two weapons ex ante lead to starkly contrasting predictions regarding
their use. Moreover, the disaggregation of “primary commodities,” which is suggested in the
civil war literature, is also important in the context of arms selection (Collier and Hoeffler 2004;
Fearon and Laitin 2003). As we demonstrated, in Cambodia, gems and rice are both primary
commodities, but arms selection varied considerably between areas specializing in the former
and those dominated by the latter.
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Tൺൻඅൾඌ
Table 1: Plans of attack
low destruction (d) high destruction (d)
low contamination (e) (no aggression) conventional weapons
high contamination (e) dirty weapons nuclear bombs
Table 2: Types of resources and predicted arms.
Characteristics of Territory Predictions
resources recovery () destruction (d) contamination (e) arms
capital-intensive slow low high dirty
labor-intensive fast high low conventional
perishable never recover low high dirty
recoverable fast high low conventional
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Fං඀ඎඋൾඌ
War phase
(t=0)
d¯d
A
e¯e
A
e¯
A wins
e
A wins
A
acq.
A wins
fight
B wins
B
acq.
A wins
fight
B wins
B
Post-war phase,
if A wins. (t  1)
w
A
evacuatelabor
D
Figure 1: Sequence of moves.
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Oඇඅංඇൾ ൺඉඉൾඇൽංඑ
Proof 1: high destruction
Given e (dirty weapons) chosen by A, B needs to find the optimal time to come back to
the territory that is now under control of A. In period t, B’s instantaneous utility to engaging in
production in the territory is
(1  t)w:
Since B is offered a fixed amount of wage by A (i.e., the history of B’s production does not
affect his income), B comes back when
(1  ~t)w  ;
where ~t is the earliest period in which B has an incentive to engage in production in the territory.
Then, we can implicitly approximate ~t as

~t  1

  
w
:
This is an approximation because time is discrete. But without any substantive costs we can
assume that the above expression holds with equality:

~t =
1

  
w
: (1)
When A has chosen conventional (“clean”) weapons, B begins production from the first period
because w > . A’s utility depends on B’s production. When e = e, A needs to wait until ~t for
B to come back and begin producing, but production takes place in every period if e = e. A’s
utilities to e and e given d are, respectively,
uA(ejd) = 1  w
1    
d
1  
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and
uA(ejd) = ~t

1  w
1    
d
1  

;
where uA(ejd) > uA(ejd). Thus, A’s choice of high destruction leads to his use of clean
weapons. The intuition is that when the defender is unable to counter-attack due to high de-
struction, the aggressor does not have any incentive to delay production by imposing negative
externalities.
Proof 2: B’s choice of surrender under low destruction
First, consider B’s production decision when e = e and f = 0, i.e., he does not counter-attack.
B comes back for production when expression 1 holds because B works for a fixed wage. B’s
continuation value to coming back in ~t is
VB;~t(l = 1jd; e; f = 0) = (1  ~t)w + (1  ~t)2w + :::
= w
"
1  ~t
1  (1  ~t)
#
:
Again, if B has an incentive to work in the territory in any t, he has an incentive to stay there
thereafter. Given the above continuation value, B’s utility to f = 0 is
uB(f = 0jd; e) =  +  + :::+ ~t 1 + ~tVB;~t(l = 1jd; e; f = 0) (2)
=
(1  ~t)
1   + 
~t w(1  ~t)
1  (1  ~t) : (3)
Next, we characterize the period in which B begins production in the territory when he fights.
He begins production in period t^ such that
(1  t^)(1  d)  : (4)
t^  1

  
(1  d) (5)
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The first LHS element of (4) represents a negative health effect incurred when he comes
back to the territory after relocation for several periods. The remaining part indicates the value
that the territory produces and he consumes. Thus, t^ < ~t because we assumed w < (1  d).
Since (1   t)(1   d) < (1   t+1)(1   2d) for any t, if B comes back at t, he will
remain in the territory in any following period.
Given t^, we characterize B’s utility to fighting.
uB(f = 1jd; e) = (1  )[( +  + 2 + :::+ t^ 1) (6)
+t^(1  t^)(1  d) + t^+1(1  t^)2(1  2d) + :::] (7)
= (1  )
"
(1  t^)
1   + 
t^
 
(1  t^)
1  (1  t^)  
(1  t^)d
1  (1  t^)
!#
(8)
B suffers the initial health threat in period t = 0 due to the counter-attack, avoids it by
relocating until period t^ -1 if he survives, and suffers again from period t^, which accumulates
thereafter.
Let us now examine cases in which ! 0 and ! 1 to make an explicit contrast between
the different rents. From expression (5), we can implicitly characterize t in which B comes back
in each case, which is given by t^0  lim!0 t^ and t^1  lim!1 t^, respectively. Then, t^0  t^1
is directly derived from the same expression (5).17 Analyzing B’s utility in each extreme case
with t^0 and t^1, we obtain that B’s utility to fighting when  !0 is greater than when  !1
because of - d.
Now we can characterize the conditions under which B prefers surrender (f = 0) to counter-
attack (f = 1), comparing uB(f = 0jd; e) and uB(f = 1jd; e) given by expressions (2) and
(8).
We let  ! 0 without any substantive costs because the value of relocation is assumed to
be small (close to 0). uB(f = 0jd; e) > uB(f = 1jd; e; ! 0) if

~tw
"
1  ~t
1  (1  ~t)
#
> (1  )t^0
"
1  t^0
1  (1  t^0)
#
; (9)
17t^1 is weakly larger because B may come back in t = 1 in both scenarios if  is very small.
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and uB(f = 0jd; e) > uB(f = 1jd; e; ! 1) if

~tw
"
1  ~t
1  (1  ~t)
#
> (1  )t^1(1  d)
"
1  t^1
1  (1  t^1)
#
: (10)
Expression (10) is more likely to be satisfied than expression (9) because B’s utility to fighting
is greater when  ! 0, i.e., uB(f = 1jd; e;  ! 0) > uB(f = 1jd; e;  ! 1); it is never the
case that expression (9) holds while (10) does not. It is straightforward to see that when the
health risk is sufficiently severe, i.e.,  is large, condition (10) holds, but (9) requires higher 
to be satisfied. To simplify the equilibrium behavior (to rule out “overlapping” behavior across
different types of resources), we focus on a case in which only (10) holds, that is,  is reasonably
high but does not immediately killB. In other words, the health threat has a weaker effect on B’s
ability to launch a counter-attack compared to physical destruction; e’s unique effect is through
disincentivizing B to engage in any activity in the contaminated territory due to the health threat.
Definition Dirty weapons are arms that pose health threat in t = 1 with probability  2 (0; 1)
such that expression (10) holds but expression (9) does not hold.
Finally, when e = e given d,
uB(f = 0jd; e) = w
1  
and
uB(f = 1jd; e) = 
1    
d
1  :
uB(f = 0jd; e) < uB(f = 1jd; e) because w < (1   d), and thus B fights regardless of the
value of . It follows that when damage is recoverable or resources are labor-intensive (! 0),
A is indifferent between e and e given d.
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Proof 3: A’s choice
When the value of  is such that B chooses to surrender after d and e, or  ! 1, A’s utility
to d = d is
uA(d; ej! 1) = 1  d  w
1  
and A’s utility to d = d is
uA(d; ej! 1) = t^11  d  w
1   ;
where uA(d; e) < uA(d; e) when states are patient or if d is large enough. It is reasonable to
suppose that the difference between d and d is large enough to cause a substantive effect, which
eliminates pair fd; eg from equilibrium when ! 1.
When the value of  is such that B chooses to fight after d and e, or  ! 0, A chooses pair
fd; eg because low destruction will end with B’s counter-attack.
Proof of Proposition 4
From expression 1, the time in which B returns to work is
t^ = log

1

  
(1  d)

= log
1

+ log [(1  d)  ]  log(1  d):
@t^
@
> 0 8 < w because  2 (0,1) and (1   d)    > 0 which follows from  < w < (1 -
d). When ! 1, from Proof 3, uA(d; ej! 1) is decreasing in t^1 because  2 (0,1), which is
true for any  2 (0,1). Therefore, an increase in  makes the selection of destructive arms more
attractive for A.
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